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A good deal has been written about the organisation and structure of the British diplomatic 
establishment since 1945. This paper seeks to use detailed quantitative and qualitative data to 
help develop an understanding of the background and career trajectories of the most senior 
figures in the Diplomatic Service in 1975. By tracing their careers it is possible to identify 
more precisely than before the changing educational and social background of these 
individuals when compared with previous generations of diplomats. The paper also examines 
certain core features of the culture of the diplomatic establishment during the post-war 
decades, analysing how it both shaped and was shaped by particular structures and practices. 
The paper argues that, despite the existence of a peripatetic career structure that dispersed 
members of the diplomatic establishment around the globe, there were still numerous 





During the three decades following the end of the War against the Axis powers, British 
governments faced a complex and evolving set of issues when managing their country’s 
external relations. Although both the nature and extent of British ‘decline’ has been 
questioned by historians,1 the unmistakeable shift in global hard power towards the two 
superpowers, when combined with the slow but inexorable end of Empire, meant that Britain 
increasingly became a ‘major power of the second order’.2 While elected politicians carried 
formal responsibility for the conduct of external relations, members of the British diplomatic 
community were important actors in the policy-making and policy-execution processes, a 
distinction that was often less clear in practice than in constitutional theory.3 Senior members 
of the diplomatic establishment played a significant role in shaping decisions on foreign 
policy, whether through offering direct advice to ministers, or by determining the flow of 
information in a way that structured perceptions of the international landscape among 
political decision-makers in London. And, because members of this self-contained 
bureaucracy staffed all the senior diplomatic positions both in London and overseas, they 
provided a strong element of continuity in the management of Britain’s foreign relations, 
serving as permanent fixtures as their political masters came and went. Their tenure also 
provided them with a level of knowledge and experience which allowed them to ensure a 
degree of continuity in the substance of foreign policy as well. 
     This article is part of a larger project designed to develop a more textured understanding 
of the post-war diplomatic community than has hitherto been possible. It is not directly 
concerned with how particular diplomatic processes were undertaken, a subject well-covered 
elsewhere,4 while a number of scholars have already given valuable overviews of the 
organisation of the diplomatic establishment during this period.5 This paper by contrast 





occupied the most senior positions in the British diplomatic establishment in 1975. It then 
goes on to explore how the development of a strong sense of shared identity among this 
cohort, fostered by a distinctive understanding of the nature of diplomatic expertise, 
countered the potentially fragmenting effects of a peripatetic career structure that continually 
moved officials to different postings around the world. The 45 individuals who form the 
focus of this study are those who in 1975 occupied the most senior grade 1 and grade 2 posts 
listed in table 1 below. In the FCO in London these posts included the Permanent Secretary 
(grade 1) and the 8 Deputy Secretaries (grade 2).  Among the 144 diplomatic posts, the 14 
most important had grade 1 heads, while the next 20 most ‘prestigious’ posts had heads at 
grade 2. There were also two additional grade 2 posts given to the second-in-commands in 
Washington and the United Nations in New York.6  
 
Table 1: Diplomatic Roles at Grades 1 and 2 (1975) 
FCO  Permanent Secretary and eight Deputy Secretaries 
Heads of 
Grade 1 Posts 
Bonn, EEC (Brussels), NATO (Brussels), Cairo, Canberra, Lagos, Moscow, 
New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, United Nations (New York), 
Washington 
Heads of 
Grade 2 Posts 
Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Brasilia, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Cape Town and 
Pretoria, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Islamabad, Kuala Lampur, 
Madrid, Nairobi, Stockholm, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Vienna, Wellington, United 
Nations (Geneva) 
Grade 2 roles 
in Posts  







All of these posts were in 1975 filled by career diplomats, with the exception of the head of 
the delegation to the United Nations in New York. This latter position was held by a political 
appointee, the former MP Ivor Richard, who has not been included in the study. We have 
instead, in view of the growing geopolitical importance of the post, added the ambassador in 
Peking (Eddie Youde) to the group. A full list of the individuals is given in the Appendix. 
     The career pathways of this Leadership Cohort, as recorded in the Diplomatic List for 
1975, have been mapped in a database that records, for each year, the location to which each 
individual was assigned along with their job title. A typical career path of 28 years for a 
diplomat joining the Foreign Office in 1947 is therefore described by 56 data-points, with the 
careers of the whole group of 45 leaders described by some 1,300 data-points in all. Since 
this material includes information both about geographical location and functional 
responsibility, it allows some tentative conclusions to be drawn about the development of 
networks within the diplomatic establishment, more specifically showing how iterated 
contacts between individuals helped to facilitate the development of a common identity and 
culture. This quantitative data has been supplemented by material that allows for a more 
qualitative analysis, including biographical details drawn from newspaper obituaries, 
memoirs, entries in reference sources including the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
and Who Was Who, along with interviews given to the British Diplomatic Oral History 
Project.7 This qualitative and quantitative information can together provide new insights into 
the way in which the organisation and culture of the British diplomatic establishment shaped 
the outlook of the 1975 Leadership Cohort that forms the subject of this study. 
     The rest of this article starts by using material in the database to examine the social and 
educational background of the 1975 Leadership Cohort. The distinctive nature of recruitment 





of new recruits to the Foreign Service was markedly different from their predecessors. They 
were nevertheless quickly inducted into a culture that emphasised the importance of 
developing a broad experience of international relations, rather than a specific expertise 
focused on a particular geographical region or functional specialisation. The article then goes 
on to examine how the organisational culture of the Foreign Service after 1945 both shaped 
and was shaped by the career paths of the individuals who belonged to it. It will be seen that 
this culture, in all its complex variety, was influenced by a distinct set of structural factors. 
Ruling assumptions did not simply descend from the ether. They were instead fostered by 
countless interactions between individuals. The culture of the British diplomatic 
establishment was founded on a set of tacit assumptions and norms which manifested 
themselves, among other ways, in a strong belief that effective diplomacy depended more on 
intelligence and nous than on a particular and easily-defined skill set. It was a culture that by 
the 1960s was increasingly seen by critics as outmoded and no longer fit for purpose. 
 
 
The Backgrounds of the Leaders of the Diplomatic Service in 1975 
 
Before considering in detail the personal backgrounds of the 1975 Leadership Cohort, it may 
be helpful to summarise the organisational evolution of the diplomatic establishment during 
the post-War period. In January 1943, the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden published 
a White Paper setting out the Government’s plans to reform the British diplomatic 
establishment at the conclusion of the War.8 These changes continued a process of reform 
stretching back over several decades, which had cumulatively sought both to reduce the 





which new entrants would be drawn.9 The structural element of the reforms was achieved in 
1943 by the amalgamation of the four organisational entities that had previously dealt with 
relations with foreign countries: the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, which had 
been partially merged in 1919-21, and the Consular and the Commercial Diplomatic Services 
(which had remained entirely separate entities).10 This integration resulted in a Foreign 
Service that remained organisationally distinct from the Home Civil Service. It also 
eliminated functional demarcations, since all members of the new Service were expected to 
serve at home or abroad, and be prepared to undertake the full portfolio of tasks (diplomatic, 
consular and trade promotion) that had previously been reserved for the individual 
organisations.11 
     In addition to these structural changes, the post-War reforms also aimed to facilitate the 
entry of qualified candidates from ‘any social sphere’ by eliminating the remaining financial 
barriers. Although the formal requirement for a private income had been abolished in 1919, in 
the inter-war years aspiring diplomats were still in practice often required to subsidise their 
careers, which restricted the field of possible entrants to the Diplomatic Service. As D.C.M. 
Platt noted in the Cinderella Service, ‘posts at the most expensive capitals were simply 
beyond the means of a man without a substantial private resource’.12 From 1945, the 
introduction of improved salaries and allowances removed this impediment both in theory 
and (more importantly) in practice.13 
     Despite these changes, the newly created Foreign Service was still constrained in its remit 
in managing Britain’s overseas relations. In 1947, a Commonwealth Service was established 
to deal with relationships with Commonwealth countries, while the Colonial Office and 
associated Colonial Service continued to administer the remaining colonial Empire.14 In the 





consolidated in a series of organisational mergers. The Foreign and Commonwealth Services 
were amalgamated in 1965 into a single Diplomatic Service, which served both the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office.15 The following year, recognising 
that most former colonies have gained their independence, the Colonial Office was merged 
with the Commonwealth Relations Office to form a single Commonwealth Office (with staff 
willing to serve abroad joining the Diplomatic Service). And in 1968, the administrative 
consolidation was completed with the merger of the two departments of state to form the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).16 
     Although the Foreign Service (from 1965 the Diplomatic Service) formally eliminated 
functional barriers, it retained an almost rigid internal stratification among its staff (as indeed 
did the Home Civil Service).17 The most privileged group were the members of Branch A, 
later to be termed the administrative class, whose members formed an elite cadre selected 
against rigorous standards. All senior appointments were made from among their number. 
Members of the administrative class were subject to a grading system which, in 1975, varied 
from the entry level of third secretary at grade 8 to the highest level of grade 1 (reserved, as 
noted above, for the Permanent Secretary and the heads of the major diplomatic missions).18      
 
 
Social and Educational Background of the 1975 Leadership Cohort 
 
The 1975 Leadership Cohort formed a distinctive group. The majority (32 out of 45) had 
joined either the Foreign or the Commonwealth Services in 1945-8 as part of a special post-
War recruitment process. These ‘Reconstruction Competitions’ were targeted mainly on 





who entered by this route had undertaken extensive military service. As a consequence they 
had an average age of twenty eight (several were aged thirty or over).19 The post-War 
recruitment process to Branch A was rigorous. Although there was a requirement for a high 
level of intellectually ability, it was recognised that many candidates had interrupted their 
university studies to join the armed forces. The formal academic qualifications were therefore 
relaxed to evidence of the ‘intellectual ability necessary for a good honours degree at a 
university’, and candidates took a written exam that was ‘of necessity … very brief and 
simple’.20 Those who passed this initial screening process were then taken in groups to a 
country house, where they undertook a range of intelligence tests, group exercises, interviews 
and presentations, which were designed to probe ‘their qualities of character (and intellect)’. 
The candidates were then finally subjected to a formal selection board.21 
     Although this process could have been used to maintain the traditional bias towards 
recruiting prospective diplomats from among a social elite, in practice a real effort seems to 
have been made to ensure that it remained objective. The process was run by the Civil 
Service Commissioners rather than the Foreign Office, and the final selection board was 
made up of senior civil servants, university academics and other members drawn from the 
professions and industry.22 The Foreign Office officials did, however, make efforts to ensure 
that the specific requirements of the Foreign Service were understood by the selectors. They 
arranged for the leaders of the country house assessment process to visit embassies in 
Washington, Paris, and Stockholm in order to observe diplomatic work at first hand, as well 
as producing a detailed description of the kind of personal qualities required for a diplomatic 
career. The attributes they identified included, naturally, the intellectual capacity to analyse 
issues and the literary skills to present their conclusions. They also sought more personal  





obtaining information and exerting influence, and [which] can often best be built up through 
social contact’. 23 
     Many of the post-War recruits had impressive war records. Michael Wilford took part in 
the Normandy landings, while John Killick and Richard Sykes were part of the airborne 
assault at Arnhem. Of the sailors, Oliver Wright earned the DSC while a commander of 
motor torpedo boats, and Anthony Duff was awarded both the DSC and the DSO for his 
exploits in submarines, which included launching a mini-torpedo attack on the Tirpitz. Both 
David Hildyard and Charles Wiggin, who served in the RAF, won the DFC for their exploits. 
Laurence Pumphrey escaped from a German Prisoner-of War camp, before ending up in 
Colditz, while Edward Tomkins walked 500 miles after escaping from the Italians. Several 
recruits had been members of the Special Operations Executive that fostered resistance 
groups in occupied territory. Derek Dodson undertook missions behind enemy lines in Italy 
and Greece. Brooks Richards was involved in a guerrilla landing in North Africa. Many of 
the future diplomats reached high rank whilst serving in the military. John Barnes, Morrice 
James, David Muirhead and Peter Ramsbotham became Lieutenant-Colonels, David Hildyard 
became a Wing-Commander, and Frederick Warner obtained the rank of Lieutenant-
Commander. It is not clear whether having a ‘good war’ in itself helped potential recruits in 
their quest to join the Foreign Service. It does seem reasonable to speculate that the qualities 
widely associated with making a good officer – resilience, leadership, determination – were 
likely to appeal to members of selection boards who were intensely conscious that they were 
recruiting the ambassadors and permanent secretaries of tomorrow.   
     13 members of the 1975 Leadership Cohort examined here did not join the diplomatic 
establishment through the special post-War recruitment scheme. Seven had already been 





and spent at least some of the war-years in diplomatic roles. They were joined by Nicholas 
Henderson, who had been unfit for military service, and became a diplomat in 1942. In 
contrast, Anthony Parsons did not join the Foreign Service until 1954 after a military career. 
The 1975 Leadership Cohort was completed by 4 members of the Colonial Service who 
transferred to the Commonwealth Service in the late 1950s and 1960s. 
     Perhaps the most surprising feature of the 1975 Leadership Cohort is that 4 members had 
started their careers in the pre-war Consular Service. These were the Permanent Under-
Secretary, Thomas Brimelow, the ambassadors in Cairo and Moscow (Phillip Adams and 
Terence Garvey respectively) and the Permanent Representative at NATO (Edward Peck). 
Before the Second World War, the Consular Service had been entirely segregated from the 
Diplomatic Service and, unlike the Diplomatic Service, it could offer a career to those 
without a private income. Its members could not usually aspire to diplomatic roles even if, as 
in the case for Brimelow, Garvey, and Peck, they had first-class honours degrees from 
Oxford. The persistence of the ‘iron curtain’ between the Consular Service and the 
Diplomatic Service during the inter-war years reflected a lingering belief – at least among 
members of the latter – that high level diplomacy required the manners, style and comme il 
faut that was supposedly found most reliably among those from upper-class backgrounds. The 
fact that 4 of the grade one roles in 1975 were filled by former members of the Consular 
Service is testimony to the determination with which the post-war reforms were implemented 
against these deep-seated prejudices (as well, of course, as the abilities of the men 
themselves).24 
     The schools and universities attended by members of the 1975 Leadership Cohort have in 
all cases been established during this research, while further information about family 





detail. The evidence shows that they were recruited from a somewhat wider social base than 
previous leadership cohorts. During the inter-war period, the traditional preference for 
diplomats to be recruited from the aristocracy had already been considerably moderated, as 
an increasing number were drawn from professional families (defined by Steiner and Dockrill 
as the army, church, bar, and medicine), although there were still very few from the ‘business 
classes’.25  These professional families also featured heavily in the backgrounds of the 1975 
Leadership Cohort. Out of the 37 men for whom data is available, 27 had fathers who were 
members of the professional classes – including the armed forces (9), church (3), bar (3) and 
medicine (3) – or who worked in such professions as teaching, academia, and the civil and 
diplomatic services. One was the son of a farmer, whilst another was the son of an ennobled 
Conservative politician. The most striking change when compared with the inter-war years 
was the presence of a sizeable minority of men – 10 out of 37 – drawn from the ‘business 
classes’ (that is their fathers had engaged in various branches of industry and commerce). The 
father of the Permanent Under-Secretary in 1975, Thomas Brimelow, had been manager of a 
textile mill in Northern England. Among the Deputy Secretaries, Alan Campbell’s father was 
involved in the silk trade, Michael Wilford was the son of a New Zealand engineer, and 
Oliver Wright’s father worked in the catering industry.  Among the ambassadors in 1975, 
Sam Falle’s father had owned a market garden, while Edward Youde’s father was a company 
secretary in a joinery business. Both Brooks Richards and Derick Ashe were the sons of 
engineers. The fathers of David Muirhead and Horace Phillips had worked in finance. 
     In a further contrast to the previous generation of inter-war recruits, at least 5 of the 1975 
Leadership Cohort came from homes with limited incomes. John Johnston’s father was a 
Baptist clergyman on a limited stipend, whilst Sam Falle noted in his memoirs that his family 





David Muirhead’s father lost money in the Great Depression, requiring his son to ‘make his 
own way early in life’, while Horace Phillips’ father was a Jewish immigrant, whose 
premature death forced his son to take a job in the Inland Revenue at age 18.26 
     The pattern of the schools attended by leaders provides additional evidence that the 1975 
Leadership Cohort had been recruited from a wider social spectrum than their predecessors. 
In the period 1919-39, over 95% of the recruits to the Diplomatic Service had attended 
private school, with 60% being alumnae of the nine public schools identified in the mid-19th 
century as ‘places of instruction for the wealthier classes’ (a quarter of whom had been to 
Eton).27 In contrast, only 75% (34 out of 45) of the diplomats considered in this study had 
attended private schools, and just 20% were drawn from the nine traditional public schools. 
Just two were old Etonians. Among the remainder, there were 9 grammar-school boys. 
Anthony Duff and Fredrick Warner attended the Royal Naval College. 
     Despite the disruptions caused by the war, 40 out of the 45 future leaders had been to 
University and, as with their pre-War counterparts, the great majority (34 out of 40) attended 
Oxford or Cambridge. Of the remaining five, three had joined the pre-war armed services, 
while (reflecting their difficult personal financial circumstances) both David Muirhead and 
Horace Phillips took jobs immediately on leaving school. The selection of these five men to 
Branch A reflects the unusual nature of the reconstruction selection process, in which 
distinguished wartime service could apparently compensate for the lack of a University 
education. Typical of the wider cultural norms in Civil Service, most of the 1975 Leadership 
Cohort had studied humanities subjects at University, but there were two, Michael Wilford 
and Andrew Stark, who had read engineering. The former was proud of this distinction, 
claiming that he was ‘the only person in the service who knew that water did not flow 





Cohort therefore constituted a significant change compared with inter-war recruits to the old 
Diplomatic Service. Without the post-war reforms set in motion by Eden’s White Paper, 
along with the sympathetic reconstruction recruitment process, a significant proportion of the 
1975 Leadership Cohort would not have had the opportunity to undertake a diplomatic career. 
It is perhaps worth noting that this (moderately) increased diversity was carried through to the 
next generation of recruits once the post-war reconstruction process was over. Plowden noted 
that 71% of the individuals recruited to the administrative branch of the Foreign Service in 
the period 1953-63 had attended private school (compared with 75% of those considered in 
this study). 94% of the 1953-63 cohort attended Oxbridge. 
 
 
The Careers of the 1975 Leadership 
 
Young diplomats recruited during the years after the Second World War could expect to 
progress relatively smoothly through the Second and First Secretary levels (grades 7 and 5), 
but the pyramid began to narrow markedly at the level of Counsellor (grade 4). This was the 
grade applied to key ‘middle-manger’ positions such as Head of a Department in the FCO or 
Head of Chancery in an embassy. The number of these roles was strictly controlled, and good 
performance at Counsellor level was often critical for continued career success. The members 
of the 1975 Leadership Cohort had by definition been successful in progressing up this 
hierarchy. Their career pathways are considered below in two sections: first, their progression 
to Counsellor level and, second, their subsequent rise to the highest reaches of the Service. In 





Foreign Service in the post-war years (of the remaining 10, six had spent their early years in 
the Commonwealth Service and four had been members of the Colonial Service).29  
 
Careers to Counsellor  
The 35 members of the Foreign Service who went on to leadership positions in 1975 took on 
average fifteen years to reach the rank of Counsellor. They were usually aged between forty 
and forty four when they reached this level. Although there were some exceptions, the pattern 
was one of a relatively uniform progression among members of the cohort, with little 
evidence of ‘high-flyers’ who received accelerated promotion compared with their peers.30 
This reflected a general tendency for advancement during the early years of careers to be 
based on length of service rather than intrinsic merit.31 One group that benefited from this 
policy was the 7 diplomats who had joined the Consular Service or the Foreign Office prior 
to hostilities. They had served in diplomatic roles for at least part of the war-time period, and 
this extra service allowed 5 of them to reach the rank of Counsellor in their thirties.32  These 
included 3 former member of the Consular Service (Thomas Brimelow, Terence Garvey and 
Edward Peck) whose former ‘inferior’ position proved no barrier to relatively rapid 
promotion. 
     The early careers of the future leaders followed a common pattern, as they were rotated 
through a number of assignments to diplomatic posts abroad, interspersed with spells in the 
Foreign Office. In their journey to Counsellor rank, these 35 diplomats undertook a total of 
131 assignments to diplomatic posts in 42 countries, with each individual undertaking an 
average of four assignments.33 Some posts were utilised more than others, and even the most 
frequent assignments, Washington and Paris, only accounted for 7 postings apiece. The 





considered here were assigned to the country (3 served with the Control Commission for the 
occupation zone, 5 were assigned to the embassy established in Bonn, and 6 spent time in 
Berlin). Other frequent postings were Athens, Cairo and Nanking/Peking (6 postings each) 
and Tehran and Ankara (with 5). In general, though, the assignments ranged throughout the 
globe, including such potential backwaters as LaPaz, Addis Ababa, and Rangoon. There is 
little evidence that specific posts were used to train the leaders of the future. 
     Despite the wide diversity of individual posts in which the future leaders served, there was 
rather greater concentration in terms of regional location. The regional distribution can be 
calibrated by comparing the pattern of posts occupied by members of the future 1975 
Leadership Cohort with the distribution of all Branch A posts. This is done in Figure 1, using 
the distribution of Branch A postings in 1959 as the comparator, whilst making use of the 
regional definitions in the Duncan report.34 As can be seen, Branch A postings were 
relatively concentrated in Western Europe (28%) and the Middle East (20%) and, as might be 
expected, the postings of the future leaders show a similar distribution. This was, however, 
even more skewed with Western Europe and the Middle East accounting for 60% of all 
postings. More specifically, the future leaders had 40% more postings to the Middle East than 
would be anticipated from the availability of posts. It may be that this region, so central to 
British diplomacy in the 1940s and 1950s, gave young diplomats a particular opportunities to 
impress (or, at least, to gain experience and visibility in an area of high importance). It is, 
however, striking that Washington D.C. saw no more than its fair share of future leaders 






     Despite the high number of Branch A postings in certain areas, the pattern of individual 
postings still shows that young diplomats were rotated through different regions (table 2), 
precluding the development of real area specialists. Almost all members of the 1975 
Leadership Cohort had experience of at least two regions before they acquired Counsellor 
rank, while half served in three or four. Some of the combinations were exotic, and seemed to 
defy any logic other than the assumption that an experienced diplomat should be able to 
operate in any setting. Oliver Wright combined postings in New York, Bucharest, Singapore 
and Pretoria. Charles Wiggins served in Stockholm, Washington, Santiago and Tehran.  
Derick Ashe was posted to the British occupation zone of Germany, La Paz, Madrid and 
Addis Ababa.  
 
Table 2 





One Two Three Four Five 
17% 34% 37% 9% 3% 
 
     
     This career pattern was, of course, entirely consistent with the desire of the Foreign 
Service to develop ‘general purpose’ officers capable of serving in any part of the world. This 
approach is further illustrated by the length of the individual postings (table 3), which shows 
that over 70% of the assignments were 3 years or less in length. This pattern militated against 
individuals acquiring a depth of expertise and dense contacts in the country concerned. On 
the other hand, it also reduced the risk that a diplomat might ‘go native’, reflecting a 
perennial fear within the diplomatic establishment that its members might lose their 
‘objectivity’ and flexibility for redeployment. 
 
Table 3 
 Length of Postings 
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
15% 26% 31% 23% 5% 
 
     One partial exception to this career pattern was provided by the Arabists. As is well 
known, the Arabists formed a strong cadre within the Foreign Service, known colloquially as 
the Camel Corps. They were supported by a specialist training school in the Lebanon, and 
one member of the 1975 Leadership Cohort, Donald Maitland, served as Director of the 
School in 1956-9.35  Plowden recorded that in 1964 there were 94 Arabic speakers in the 





just 14 Chinese speakers.36 Six members of the 1975 Leadership Cohort had received three or 
more postings to the Middle East and related areas. Philip Adams served in Beirut twice, as 
well as having postings to Cairo, Jeddah and Khartoum. Anthony Parsons had, by 1975, been 
posted to Baghdad, Ankara, Amman, Cairo, and Khartoum. The careers of the Arabists 
nevertheless remained exceptional: the dominant pattern of diplomatic careers was one of 
rotation between regions. 
     A key aim of the post-War reforms was to create an integrated Foreign Service in which 
officers were expected to undertake a full range of political, consular, and commercial duties. 
Although the Diplomatic List gives only generalised job-titles for junior diplomats, these 
demonstrate that a large number of the 1975 Leadership Cohort had at some stage taken on 
consular and commercial roles, rather than the political roles that were the exclusive preserve 
of the pre-War Diplomatic Service. The evidence suggest that 6 members of the cohort had 
been assigned to consular posts earlier in their career, while another 5 had received postings 
that combined political and consular duties in one of the smaller embassies. 4 of the future 
leaders had previously held roles as First Secretaries or Counsellors primarily concerned with 
commercial issues. These results seem to confirm the general observation by D.C.M. Platt 
that, by the 1950s, almost a third of Branch A members were undertaking consular or 
commercial roles. 37 
     Alternating overseas assignments with postings to London was one constant feature of the 
early career paths of the 1975 Leadership Cohort. New recruits typically spent an initial 
period in the Foreign Office before their first assignment to a foreign post, subsequently 
returning to London for one or two further spells during their early careers (that is before 
promotion above Counsellor level). This pattern is illustrated by the careers of the 35 





recruitment to the end of their first post at Counsellor level, of which seven years (40%) was 
spent in the Foreign Office. There were, of course, significant variations in this pattern, but 
none of the diplomats reached the level of Counsellor without spending time in London. This 
approach was presumably designed to eliminate the last vestiges of an historic bifurcation 
between the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. The reforms in the inter-war years 
had gone a long way towards integrating these two groups, at least among the younger 
officials,38 but the process was only fully completed after 1945, when career progression was 
used to forge a cadre of diplomats adept at working both in London and overseas.  
     The periods spent in the Foreign Office were critical for an individual’s career 
development, since it gave them opportunities to interact directly with the senior levels of the 
Office, as well as developing their understanding of how policy-making worked within the 
core executive. Two roles were of particular importance: a posting to a ministerial Private 
Office and a posting as Head of a Department. The ambassador in Bonn in 1975, Nicholas 
Henderson, gave a much-quoted account of his two spells in the Private Office of the Foreign 
Secretary, in which he described Private Secretaries as the ‘impresarios of Whitehall’, 
exercising exceptional influence by representing ‘to the Minister the opinion of the office and 
to the latter the will of the Minister’.39 The Departmental Heads were by contrast middle 
managers who, as William Strang observed, stood ‘at the point where the flow of 
recommendations from below meets the flow of directions from above’.40 This role was 
normally filled by diplomats undertaking their first or second role at Counsellor level (by 
which time they had 15-20 years of experience). Many diplomats have testified that their time 
as a Departmental Head was among the most testing yet rewarding of their career.41 It was a 





      Many members of the 1975 Leadership Cohort who joined the Foreign Service after 1945 
had, not surprisingly, held position in a Private Office or served as a Head of Department on 
their way to the top. 28 out of the 35 had served as Department Heads, 20 had been members 
of the Private Office, and 15 had undertaken both roles. Only two of the future leaders 
(Anthony Parsons and Horace Phillips) reached the highest levels without occupying either 
position.42 5 of the men whose careers are reviewed here (Guy Millard, Michael Palliser, 
Laurence Pumphrey, Oliver Wright and Edward Youde) had served in the Prime Minister’s 




Careers After Reaching the Rank of Counsellor 
It took on average 10 more years after promotion to Counsellor for the individuals studied 
here to reach the positions they occupied in 1975 (by which time most were in their mid-
fifties). Members of the 1975 Leadership Cohort who were recruited immediately after the 
War had typically undertaken four further roles before reaching the most senior levels. Their 
careers continued to combine overseas postings with spells in London (on average 35% of 
their time was spent in London). In London, the grade 3 posts were as Assistant Secretaries 
which, after the formation of the FCO in 1968, became a somewhat problematic role. The 
merger of the Commonwealth and Foreign Offices resulted in an excess of Under Secretaries, 
leading to a convoluted structure in which departments were supervised by both a Deputy and 
an Assistant Secretary, adding a layer to the hierarchy. As Geoffrey Moorhouse noted in his 
1977 book The Diplomats, ‘nothing is more indistinct … than the relationship between the 





Under-Secretary is solely in charge of anything’.43  This confusion was mirrored by the 
experience of the men included in this study. John Killick remarked that the role left him as 
‘a bit of a spare wheel’. Alan Campbell noted that as Assistant Under-Secretary, he was ‘in 
many respects … less involved in important work’ than in his former role as Head of 
Department.44 
     The grade 3 posts overseas often carried more definite responsibilities, whether as a 
second-in-command at one of the larger posts or as chief of a smaller post. Postings as Head 
of a grade 3 post could sometimes provide useful experience for later assignments. Philip 
Adams’ period in Amman (1966-69) was doubtless of value in his subsequent posting as 
ambassador in Cairo. In most cases, though, assignments were unrelated. Derek Dodson was 
ambassador to Budapest and Brasilia. Bernard Ledwidge served as ambassador in Helsinki 
and Tel Aviv. Peter Ramsbotham headed up missions in Nicosia and Washington. There were 
no examples of an individual who had served as second-in-command at a post being 
immediately appointed as Head of Mission. Some Heads of grade 1 and 2 posts in 1975 had, 
though, worked in the same place earlier in their careers. The ambassador in Paris in 1975, 
Edward Tomkins, was previously Counsellor at the embassy in 1954-58. The ambassador in 
Athens, Brooks Richards, had previously been First Secretary there in 1952-53. And, in 
perhaps the best example of career planning, Edward Youde, the ambassador in Peking in 
1975, had been posted to the country three times before (1948-50, 1953-5, and 1960-1). 
There is, however, little evidence to suggest that prior experience of a particular post was 
generally a significant factor in selecting grade 1 and 2 heads. Indeed, the reverse seems to 
have been true. The career patterns of the 1975 Leadership Cohort reflected an organisational 
culture committed to developing generalists who could service in a variety of regions and 







Career Structures and Organisational Culture 
 
The idea that developing generalists might represent ‘the apotheosis of the dilettante’, to use 
Thomas Balogh’s celebrated phrase, would have been complete anathema to members of the 
1975 Leadership Cohort.45 The ‘cult of the generalist’ was nevertheless already under assault 
in the 1960s, at a time when the individuals who form the focus of this study were beginning 
to occupy senior positions within the diplomatic establishment.46 The 1964 Plowden Report, 
despite its fundamentally conservative character,47 still favoured the development of greater 
specialisation among members of the Foreign Service, to be fostered by careful career 
planning and secondment to outside bodies.48 It also explicitly emphasised ‘the importance of 
commercial work’. The 1969 Duncan Report on ‘The United Kingdom’s Overseas 
Representation’, which sought to reshape the British diplomatic establishment in response to 
a shrinking world role, was even more emphatic about the need to ensure ‘the clear 
precedence that belongs to the commercial objective in the day-to-day conduct of British 
relations with other countries’. As part of this process, Duncan believed that diplomats 
needed to build up a ‘real measure of regional and/or functional expertise’.49 This focus on 
the need for greater specialisation within the diplomatic establishment was part of a more 
general shift in attitudes towards public administration. The 1964 Fabian Pamphlet The 
Administrators firmly linked change in the civil service with the wider modernisation of 
Britain’s economy and society, calling for an end to ‘amateurism’ and greater training to 
ensure that civil servants had the skills needed to cope with their work.50  And, of course, the 





organisation and culture designed to promote the virtues of professionalism (broadly 
understood as the possession of skills and knowledge that allowed the individual to tackle 
problems based on an expert knowledge of the difficulties involved and the best ways of 
overcoming them).51 The concern within these various reports about the socially elitist 
character of senior civil servants reflected not only a commitment to widening ‘access’, but 
also, and probably more importantly, a sense that such a structure actually reduced 
effectiveness by failing to exploit the widest possible pool of talented individuals.  
     The Fulton Report was rooted in the technocratic culture favoured by the then Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson, but it also reflected a sense that the wider world of business had 
long since abandoned ‘amateurism’. The same ethos can be detected in the Duncan Report 
(Sir Val Duncan had himself made his reputation as chairman of Rio Tinto Zinc). The 
Duncan Report’s emphasis on the need to promote British economic interests, both by 
focusing attention on regions of particular importance, and by ensuring that members of the 
Diplomatic Service had the skills to deal effectively with trade and financial issues, attracted 
considerable opprobrium from those opposed to such a strategy. A number of retired 
diplomats wrote to the press complaining that the focus on economic questions in effect 
reduced Britain to ‘a nation of shopkeepers’, and abandoned a centuries-old tradition in 
which diplomatic missions abroad ‘represented our mode of life, our standards, our political 
system, our interest in freedom and peace’.52 Duncan defended his Report, rightly pointing 
out that it had been widely misrepresented, but the debate did capture a genuine disagreement 
both about the scope of Britain’s overseas representation and the extent to which the 
diplomatic task could be reduced to a set of problems susceptible to technocratic solutions. It 
also reflected important questions about (to slip into scholarly jargon) institutional 





environmental pressures shape different institutions towards developing similar structures 
and cultures.53 All foreign ministries by their very nature straddle the domestic and 
international spheres, with the result that they do not always sit easily within the 
organisational rules and cultural conventions that frame the development of ‘purely’ domestic 
ministries.54 The question of whether the Foreign Office should be seen simply as another 
government ministry, susceptible to a universal language of reform, became in the 1960s and 
1970s an issue both about the nature of diplomacy as well as the setting for conflict about 
who had the authority and knowledge to define how the Diplomatic Service should seek to 
carry out its work effectively.     
     It has long been recognised that the culture of a particular institution helps to determine all 
aspects of its modus operandi, even if it remains difficult to develop a precise understanding 
of a phenomenon that is by its nature elusive and hard to define. The culture of an 
organisation can, however, itself be influenced by formal structures and procedures. 
Organisational culture is typically created ‘from within’ rather than imposed from the outside 
(something that inevitably makes the task of reform very difficult). In the words of Edgar 
Schien, it represents ‘the pattern of basic assumptions that a particular group has invented, 
discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration’. Mary Jo Hatch has used Schien’s work to develop a model based on 
four interactive components designed to explain how groups maintain and develop their 
culture. She suggests that the foundation of a particular organisation’s internal culture is to be 
located in a  shared set of assumptions that support values and behavioural norms, which 
together form the ‘unwritten rules and common body of knowledge that allow members of a 
culture to know what is expected of them in a wide variety of situations’. These values and 





or physical objectives that act as ‘manifestations or expressions’ of the culture. Some of these 
artefacts in turn become symbols, invested with a ‘meaning and significance that goes beyond 
its intrinsic content’. Assumptions, values, artefacts and symbols are in constant interaction 
within the organisation, and it is this interaction that either reinforces the existing culture, or 
causes elements of it to develop and evolve.55 
     It is always difficult to link abstract models of organisational theory to concrete day-to-
day operations. The advantage of Hatch’s model for this study is that it acknowledges how 
artefacts and symbols can, when taken together, both reflect and reinforce values and norms. 
Or, to put it in terms directly relevant to this research, the distinctive career structure of the 
Diplomatic Service was both an ‘artefact’ that manifested underlying assumptions and values, 
as well as a symbolic expression of the idea that diplomacy could not be reduced to a set of 
functional skills or regional specialisations. Nor was it only the peripatetic career structure 
that could serve both as artefact and symbol. The following pages show how these theoretical 
insights can be combined with a reading of memoirs and other first-hand accounts to 
illuminate various aspects of the organisational culture of the administrative class of the 
Foreign and Diplomatic Services during the first thirty years of the post-war era. Such a 
process inevitably falls short of the kind of rigorous assessment demanded by ethnographic 
scholars, but it can go some way to meet the criteria set by Tony Watson, by giving an insight 
into ‘how things work[ed]’ within the senior branch of the diplomatic community.56 
     The administrative class within the diplomatic establishment had a common identity 
rooted in a shared set of assumptions about its character and worth. It saw itself as the 
leadership of an elite Service dealing with a vital aspect of the nation’s affairs, in the process 
displaying a sense of collective superiority to other elements of the Civil Service that at times 





skills and experience, which they believed made British diplomats among the best in the 
world.57 It was a view neatly summed up in a valedictory dispatch written in 1983 by Percy 
Craddock, the ambassador to China, who wrote ‘[t]hough I have met, very occasionally, 
sharper minds at the bar and greater accumulation of learning at universities, for a general 
assemblage of intelligence and professional skills, flexibility and loyalty, the Diplomatic 
Service is surely unsurpassed’.58 In John Dickie’s words, the Service had an ‘esprit de corps 
which imbues everyone … with a sense of mission unparalleled in any other branch of 
government’. They were ‘the crème de la crème: they know it, and rarely let an opportunity 
pass to ensure that other lesser beings realize it’.59 
     Peter Hennessy has rightly noted that the Diplomatic Service ‘has never liked any 
institution interfering with its monopoly of dealing with “abroad” on behalf of Whitehall’.60 
The bureaucratic imperatives of this assumption were spelt out to young recruits in the 1970s, 
when they were told by their seniors that ‘a high priority of the FCO is not only to coordinate 
all other ministries in their dealings with foreigners, but to influence their relevant policies’.61 
The same was true thirty years earlier, when most members of the 1975 Leadership Cohort 
were recruited, at a time when the monopoly of professional diplomats in managing Britain’s 
external relations was far more secure. There was a strong belief within the diplomatic 
establishment throughout the post-war decades that, in order to perform effectively, its 
members should continue to be administratively distinct from the Home Civil Service. This 
demarcation itself became a veritable symbol of the belief among members of the Diplomatic 
Service that they constituted a self-contained elite uniquely qualified to deal with 
international relations.62 Anthony Sampson noted in 1981 that Home civil servants often 
resented ‘the hauteur and extravagance of British diplomats’, who perpetuated ‘the image of 





at frustrating any attempts to introduced reforms of the kind proposed by Plowden and 
Duncan.63 Members of the Diplomatic Service genuinely believed that their need to navigate 
between the domestic and international environment meant they could not operate according 
to the same rules and conventions as their home counterparts if they were to perform their 
work effectively. It was a distinction that later became harder to maintain after entry into the 
European Economic Community began to fray the boundary between the ‘domestic’ and the 
‘foreign’. 
     In the Victorian and Edwardian eras, the diplomatic community had shared a common 
aristocratic background that, as Thomas Otte writes, ‘created a special sense of 
“brotherhood”’.64 The individuals recruited after 1945 were, as noted earlier, drawn from a 
wider set of social backgrounds than their predecessors. The sense of ‘brotherhood’ was not 
present from birth, so to speak, but instead created through formal education and within the 
Foreign (later Diplomatic) Service itself. For most members of the 1975 Leadership Cohort, 
this process of acculturation started with education at Oxford or Cambridge, which then as 
now commanded a privileged position within the national culture. The demanding nature of 
the selection process for the Foreign Service, repeatedly mentioned by many former 
diplomats in their memoirs, reinforced the perception among successful recruits that they 
were joining an elite organisation. The administrative grade itself operated as a meritocracy 
in which privileged backgrounds per se conferred no obvious advantages in terms of career 
progression. The emphasis on informality at the Foreign Office in London – where even the 
most junior recruits were expected to enter the offices of their seniors without knocking – 
was itself a paradoxical expression of this meritocracy.65 Seniority was something that had 
been earned, rather than evidence of some form of inherent superiority, and was therefore 





the reach counsellor rank, after just 9 years, were Sam Falle and Horace Phillips, who both 
came from relatively humble backgrounds. There was, it seems, some truth in William 
Strang’s much quoted remark that just as Napoleon’s soldiers carried a Marshal’s baton in 
their knapsacks, so it ‘may be said of the Foreign Service, with much greater reason, that 
every Third Secretary carries an ambassador’s credentials in his brief-case’.66 
     To return once more to the language of Mary Jo Hatch, one of the most significant 
‘artefacts’ that characterised the culture of the Service was the approach taken to developing 
the skills required for diplomatic roles. It was a matter of considerable pride, mentioned in 
many diplomatic memoirs, that British diplomats developed their skills by practical 
experience rather than formal training.67 Most of them would have happily agreed with 
Christopher Meyer’s later remark that the British diplomatic tradition is ‘not to be overly 
abstract or intellectual’ but rather to ‘learn by example’.68 The scepticism about formal 
training itself became a symbol of an organisational culture that believed effective diplomacy 
was less a matter of definite knowledge and skills than a subtle mixture of nous and aptitude. 
All those who entered the Foreign Service in the post-war period went through a process of 
practical training that began from their earliest days in the Foreign Office. New recruits were 
quickly assigned a specific area of responsibility, and seated in the ‘third room’, the common 
office shared by the junior members of a department. Here the aspiring diplomat learnt the 
tools of his trade from the more experienced occupants. John Killick recalled that when 
assigned to the Japan and Pacific Department, in 1946, he was expected ‘to learn the ropes’ 
by ‘force of example’.69 
     This process of acquiring diplomatic expertise through undertaking ‘real’ roles, under the 
guidance of more senior colleagues, continued throughout the careers of the 1975 Leadership 





(something that a later generation of senior diplomats, immersed in the language of 
management consultancy and KPIs, doubtless look back at with nostalgia). The handing 
down of experience from one generation to the next helped to buttress the strong sense of 
shared identity still so visible among senior members of the Diplomatic Service in the 1970s. 
Critics of the ‘cult of the generalist’, like Sir Val Duncan and his colleagues, believed that 
Britain’s changing role in the world needed a fundamental reorientation in the objectives of 
diplomacy – something that would in turn demand greater professionalism and specialist 
knowledge among its practitioners. These arguments found little traction among members of 
the diplomatic establishment. Such resistance was not, though, simply a self-interested 
defence of the status quo. It was also rooted in the strong conviction that diplomatic expertise 
could not be reduced to a discrete set of functional skills and knowledge. This sense of 
common identity – of being members of an intellectually elite profession united by a shared 
understanding of complex matters opaque to outside observers – can easily be dismissed as a 
self-interested delusion on the part of ‘intelligent, urbane but managerially innocent 
mandarins’.70 It may, though, be possible to take a more benign view. 
     Much of the criticism directed against civil servants during the 1960s and 1970s, including 
members of the British diplomatic establishment, was rooted in a view of professional 
knowledge that itself now seems increasingly archaic. The idea of such knowledge as a 
distinct corpus, capable of being taught in a formal setting, has in most professions given way 
to a recognition of the power of ‘situated learning’: in other words, it has come to be widely 
accepted that the development of professional knowledge is profoundly shaped by the social 
and organisational setting in which it operates. Much criticism of the administrative 
‘generalist’ in the 1960s and 1970s was rooted in a belief that they had not been taught the 





for more training and specialisation to overcome this shortcoming. And yet, if professional 
knowledge and skills are both deeply embedded in particular contexts, then a defence of 
expertise focusing on tacit knowledge and the informal transmission of experiential ‘wisdom’ 
from one generation to another begins to appear in a different light. The idea of a diplomatic 
expertise characterised by a fluid set of experiences and insights, inculcated over time by 
exposure to a range of situations, can be seen less as a defence of parochial interests and more 
as a genuine insight into the knowledge and aptitudes needed by those responsible for the 
conduct of Britain’s relations with other countries.71 
     The peripatetic career pattern of the 1975 Leadership Cohort played a critical role, then, in 
creating and sustaining the culture of the Diplomatic Service sketched out above. It ensured 
that all diplomats had a relatively uniform career experience that helped bind them together 
into a single coherent group. The constant rotation through different posts did, however, pose 
one potential obstacle to the process of acculturation. The development of an integrative 
culture is greatly facilitated when the members of the group are personally acquainted. This 
raises the question of whether members of the 1975 Leadership Cohort were able to develop 
close face-to-face personal relationships with their peers during their rise to the top of the 
Service, despite the existence of a career structure that emphasised mobility both from place 
to place and role to role. The database developed as part of this research project makes it 
possible to pursue a quantitative analysis of this issue (albeit one that needs to be 
supplemented by more qualitative judgements). It seems logical to assume that when a pair of 
diplomats was posted to the same location they had numerous opportunities to become 
acquainted. The extent of such co-locations can serve as at least a rough proxy for members 






     Of the 45 men who belonged to the 1975 Leadership Cohort, 35 had been members of the 
post-war Foreign Service (the other ten, as noted earlier, belonged to the Commonwealth or 
Commercial services). Each individual member of this group therefore had 34 other members 
with whom they could form a pair (which, when aggregated, gives 595 possible pairs of 
diplomats). The database has been used to analyse these 595 pairs to see on how many 
occasions two diplomats were in the same location at the same time. The results of this 




Table 4: Number of occasions on which a pair of diplomats  
were co-located 
None One Two Three Four and 
Five 
8% 28% 37% 21% 6% 
 
 
The statistics suggest that there were ample opportunities for members of the 1975 
Leadership Cohort who belonged to the Foreign (later Diplomatic) Service to develop a dense 
network of personal interactions. 550 out of the possible 595 pairs (92%) were co-located on 
at least one occasion, whilst 381 of the pairs (64%) were together on more than one occasion. 
All but two of the 35 diplomats had been in the same geographical location at one time or 
another with three quarters or more of their future colleagues in the 1975 Leadership Cohort. 





     Although 51 of the pairs of the future leaders had worked side-by-side in overseas posts, 
the key meeting place was the Foreign Office. In the twenty years between 1947 and 1967, in 
any given year at least 20% of the 35 were located in London; in some periods, such as the 
early 1950s, more than 40% were posted to the Foreign Office at the same time. While the 
size of the diplomatic establishment in London may have diluted the significance of such co-
location, not least given the functional boundaries between different departments, it still 
seems reasonable to assume that proximity provided opportunities for individuals to develop 
knowledge of one another’s character and abilities. A more personal insight into the 
phenomenon can be illustrated by the case of Alan Campbell, who served as a Deputy 
Secretary in 1975, and later became an assiduous author of obituaries. Campbell wrote 
obituaries for eight of his colleagues in the 1975 Leadership Cohort, in the process noting that 
he had got to know seven of them when they had worked together in London (he had worked 
with the eighth, Bernard Ledwige, when they served together in Paris).72 
     The constant cycling of diplomats through roles in the Foreign Office as part of their 
career paths had a double advantage in influencing the organisational culture of the 
diplomatic establishment. Not only did it eliminate the former distinction between the 
Foreign Office clerks and the overseas diplomats. It also allowed individuals to become 
personally acquainted with one another, thereby facilitating the formation and reinforcement 
of shared values and norms. The peripatetic career path was not simply an expression of an 
organisation culture that was sceptical of the idea of the ‘expert’ (or, rather, which defined 
‘expertise’ somewhat paradoxically by the ability to master a wide range of roles). It also 
facilitated the transmission of this culture by ensuring an almost constant flow of personal 





integrated organisational culture despite the fact that members of the Diplomatic Service 
were often geographically dispersed and engaged on radically different work. 
 
 
Conclusions and Perspectives 
 
The previous pages have shown how the peripatetic career pattern of the post-war diplomatic 
community helped to develop generalist diplomats within an institution characterised by an 
integrated organisational culture. Such a career pattern was designed to achieve the 
‘standardisation of skills’ described by Henry Mitzberg as the hallmark of a ‘professional 
bureaucracy’ (that is one in which skilled individuals work with a high degree of autonomy 
within a geographically and/or functionally dispersed environment).73 Members of the 
administrative grade of the British diplomatic establishment shared a core set of skills and 
aptitudes, developed through practical experience, and were part of an organisation in which 
many were acquainted on a personal basis – characteristics which together helped ensure a 
high level of coordination of the complex portfolio of diplomatic tasks. The Service had well 
developed bureaucratic mechanisms to coordinate activity, with a constant flow of 
instructions from London defining goals and negotiating lines, but the effectiveness of these 
processes was greatly enhanced by a shared understanding of accepted diplomatic practice 
and personal familiarity between many of the key players. 
     We conclude this article by identifying three broad areas for future research that can build 
on some of its insights. The first of these is the need to place the developments viewed here 
in the context of the longue durée. The development of the institutions responsible for 





scholars.74 There is, however, space for a more detailed consideration of how some of the 
trends discussed in this article developed during the decades after the retirement of members 
of the 1975 Leadership Cohort. Most of its members were still in place during the turbulent 
period leading up to the publication of the Central Policy Review Staff’s 1977 Review of 
Overseas Representation Report, which recommended a weakening of the division between 
the Home Civil Service and the Foreign Service, as well as a restructuring focused on the 
promotion of trade.75 The diplomatic community was remarkably successful in mobilising 
sections of the Establishment against the proposals. It became harder in the following decades 
to defend the autonomy of the FCO against the strictures that its officials were too 
extravagant and unaccountable. In 1989, ten years after Margaret Thatcher came to power, a 
report commissioned by the FCO revealed a massive slump in staff morale, partly rooted in 
concerns about internal division and poor career management. The endless public sector 
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, designed to promote the organisational and cultural change 
needed to promote greater efficiency, also played a key role in damaging sentiment within the 
FCO (as they did across Whitehall).76 So, too, did the conduct of foreign affairs under the 
Labour governments of 1997-2010, which saw decision-making still further concentrated in 
Number 10.77 The continual development of the European Union greatly eroded the boundary 
between domestic and foreign affairs and de facto challenged the boundary between the 
Foreign and Home services. Even William Hague’s subsequent efforts to restore the place of 
the FCO to ‘its rightful place in the Whitehall sun’,78 albeit in a context that still placed great 
emphasis on its role in fostering Britain’s economic fortunes,79 did not ameliorate the 
continued focus on improving performance by constant measurement of performance against 
defined criteria. It would be valuable to develop greater knowledge of whether and how the 





tacit knowledge survived in a political and administrative environment focused on measuring 
tangible achievement. It would also be helpful to examine further whether attempts by FCO 
staff to block reforms were rooted not simply in a defence of personal and departmental 
interest, but also in a conviction that local practices that might seem irrational or inefficient to 
outsiders can have a real value in securing institutional objectives. In other words, to return to 
an earlier point, is resistance to a form of coercive isomorphism, rooted in the centralising 
tendency of government, sometimes a rational defence of the virtues of heterogeneity as a 
mechanism for maximising the effectiveness of a particular institution?  
     The second area where future research could be helpful is the need to develop a more 
comparative perspective on the development of diplomatic establishments over time. The 
previous pages have focused on the careers of the few dozen men who occupied the most 
senior positions in the British diplomatic community in 1975. Even the briefest comparison 
with developments across the Atlantic shows, however, striking similarities between the 
evolution of the US Foreign Service and its British counterpart despite the huge differences in 
the domestic political and administrative environments (evidence, perhaps, that pressures 
towards institutional isomorphism have an international character).80 There was throughout 
the post-war period almost continuous debate in the USA both about the structure of the 
Foreign Service and the skills needed by its members. The ACCORD project set in motion in 
the 1960s by William Crockett, a veteran State Department official, produced a series of 
proposals for changes in both institutional structure and personnel development. In 1970 a 
new report, Diplomacy for the 1970s, issues a series of recommendations including the 
development of more specialists within the Foreign Service with specific geographical or 
functional expertise. Nor, of course, are transatlantic comparisons alone of value. During the 





admiring the French Civil Service for its emphasis on scientific training and the pervasive 
influence of the technocratic énarques. Whether this culture produced more effective 
diplomats is a matter of debate. Ruth Dudley Edwards suggested in 1994 that the advantage 
was with the FCO, since ‘the British [diplomatic] culture shares information while the French 
tend to hug it to themselves’.81 More recently, the FCO has used a series of KPIs developed 
under the Diplomatic Excellence initiative to suggest that it is the second highest performing 
diplomatic service in the world behind its French counterpart (assigning itself the unfeasibly 
precise mark of 6.8/10).82 More systematic comparison between different diplomatic 
establishments over time would facilitate new perspectives on how diplomatic expertise has 
been understood in different countries at different times, as well as identifying whether its 
development (in whatever form) has been shaped primarily by domestic cultures and 
traditions, or instead as a response to the demands of the international environment. It might 
also help to provide the foundations for a more sustained analysis of diplomatic expertise as 
an amalgam of practice and embedded knowledge.83 Do claims to such expertise reflect a 
genuine possession of a clear-sighted understanding of the subtleties of global politics and 
economics? Is it really the case that a defence of idiosyncratic cultures and organisational 
structures can be grounded in a sophisticated situational understanding of issues and 
problems invisible to the overly-uniform perspective of a rationalising centre? Or does the 
evidence suggest that those who make such claims are merely victims of the curse of 
bounded rationality, prisoners in an iron cage that determines their analysis of the world, and 
may represent little more than a demand for autonomy and influence against other competing 
institutions? 
     This last point raises a third possible area for future research: the need for a detailed 





establishment affected its performance in securing favourable outcomes. The FCO today 
employs a rather unconvincing methodology for measuring its performance that assigns 50% 
to ‘policy’ defined as making a difference to ‘British interests, businesses and people’.84 In 
reality, as senior officials in the Department have repeatedly argued, it is difficult to identify 
definite metrics for measuring something as uncertain as foreign policy outcomes. And, from 
the historian’s perspective, any attempt to examine the performance of the British Diplomatic 
Service at a particular moment in time necessarily tends to push one towards a counterfactual 
history which speculates about how outcomes could have been different. It would 
nevertheless be helpful to consider historical case-studies that can illuminate, if only in 
somewhat speculative terms, how the uncertain variable of diplomatic excellence can play 
out in the real world of international politics. 
     Even in the absence of such detailed studies, though, it is still reasonable to conclude that 
if the British Diplomatic Service had in the three decades after 1945 abandoned its emphasis 
on the value of the generalist, instead promoting high levels of functional or regional 
specialisation, then the coherence of the diplomatic process would have been significantly 
disrupted. Such an approach would in all probability have produced competing sets of sub-
cultures rooted in specific tasks or regions. If such regional and functional sub-groupings had 
been the norm, then it would have made the overall management and direction of the 
diplomatic effort more difficult. There would have been a need for greater central direction 
from London to arbitrate between competing factions who lacked a shared orientation to the 
Service as a whole. The greater depth of specialist knowledge might have given some 
compensation for this loss of coherence among the diplomatic establishment. On balance, 













Appendix: The Diplomats included in this study 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
 
Heads of Grade 2 posts 
Brimelow, Thomas  
Arthur, Geoffrey 
Campbell, Alan 
Killick, John  
Maitland, Donald  
Tebbit, Donald  
Watson, Duncan  
Wilford, Michael 
Wright, Oliver 









Ashe, Derick (Buenos Aires) 
Barnes, John (The Hague) 
Bottomley, James (Pretoria/Cape Town) 
Cole, David (Bangkok) 
Dodson, Derrick (Brasilia) 
Duff, Anthony (Nairobi) 
Falle, Sam (Stockholm) 
Galsworthy, Arthur (Dublin) 
Hildeyard, David (UN, Geneva) 
  Laskey, Denis 
Le Quesne, Martin 
(Vienna) 
(Lagos) 
Heads of Grade 1 posts Ledwidge, Bernard (Tel Aviv) 
Adams, Philip (Cairo) Norris, George (Kuala Lumpur) 
Garvey, Terrance (Moscow) Parsons, Anthony (Tehran) 
Henderson, Nicholas (Bonn) Phillips, Horace (Ankara) 
James, Morrice (Canberra) Pumphrey, Laurence (Islamabad) 
Johnson, John (Ottawa) Richards, Brooks (Athens) 
Le Quesne, Martin (Lagos) Scott, David (Wellington) 
Millard, Guy (Rome) Stark, Andrew (Copenhagen) 
Palliser, Michael (EEC, Brussels) Wiggin, Charles (Madrid) 
Peck Edwards (NATO, Brussels)   










(UN New York)* 
(Washington)** 
(Peking, Ambassador) 
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